One of then greatest questions discussed by historians for decades;
Could Britain have repelled a numerically superior and better trained
armed forces if Germany had invaded in 1940?
I have to answer yes, even though many people including my Father
(God bless him) would disagree. Why do I chose to disagree? There is
plenty of evidence to suggest that a German invasion, would have
failed.
One also has to assume that Germany had sufficient transport for its
infantry ( landing craft and JU-52 transport aircraft) as in 1940 it
had neither.
As is well documented, the British Expeditionary Force (together with
Belgian and French soldiers) were evacuated from France in May-June
1940, the majority of which were evacuated form the port of Dunkirk.
There was very little in the way of equipment taken back to Britain
as space was too valuable on board the boats and ships, indeed most
of the troops did not posses a rifle.
Image
found
at:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060969/Remembrance-Day-2011-Dunkirk-photos-German-soldiers-album-seen-1st-time.html, accessed 19/11/13.
Ibid.
After
Dunkirk and other evacuations including Cherbourg Brest and St
Lo,what did Britain posses to repel German troops? Britain had
witnessed the much feared German blitzkrieg scythe through Europe.
France would capitulate by June 22nd. 1
With the
three main branches of the German armed forces working in cooperation
with each other and not competing Operation Sea Lion could have taken
place. Would an invasion have been successful? Fortunately we shall
never know. One thing is certain however, a German victory would not
have been easy or quick, unlike the relatively easy victories of the
Low Countries and Denmark.
Britain had learned a valuable lesson in the Battle of France- not to
rely on fixed defensive lines like those of the Maginot Line. France
and Britain were still using tactics from the First World War whereas
Germany had developed blitzkrieg (lightning war). Attacks with
strength and speed were used, dive bombing Stukas with deafening
sirens, closely followed by tanks and armoured personnel carriers and
infantry. Germany had learned from the mistakes of the 1914-1918 war,
whereas it's enemies had not. Fixed defences with all the guns
pointing in one direction proved to be a complete failure. Airborne
troops and glider troops proved this system of defence to be
obsolete. There were also gaps in the line, at the Belgian border and
the Ardennes. The Ardennes was said to be impenetrable, and then used
by the Germans for their main armoured thrust in 1940.
What
Defences Were Used By Britain For Home Defence?
Britain
used many methods of defence whilst awaiting an invasion. The problem
was forecasting where the invasion was going to arrive. It was
impossible to forecast this without good intelligence, so Britain had
to expect to be attacked on the southern and south eastern coasts as
this was the shortest route from occupied France. In fact most of the
coastline would be defended by some means, if only by barbed wire.
The most
obvious defence was the English Channel. As the Germans were not
prepared for an assault by the sea, they lacked landing craft and
their navy was much smaller than that of the Royal Navy. The German
plan was to transport men and horses across the English Channel using
towed barges. Unless the Royal Air Force was defeated, this would
mean some of the crossing would have to take place in darkness,
seriously affecting the ability of the Luftwaffe to defend an
invasion fleet. The darkness would work in the favour of the Royal
Navy however, it would only take one destroyer going at full speed
ahead to sink these barges by its wash alone, without firing it's
guns.
(Image of
barbed wire beach defences found
at:http://www.walberswickww2.co.uk/imagebank/
).
Barbed
wire, would be the next form of defence as previously stated, it
would be laid across the beaches in varying depths, this would ensure
the defenders would be able to easily pick off the Germans as they
landed, in 1940 there was no way through it other than wire cutters.
The wire and minefields would be covered by soldiers in trenches and
pillboxes. Unlike the Maginot Line, this was not designed to be the
only defence, there would be more lines of defence further inland.
Ironside had been put in charge of British defence on the 27th
May 1940 and realised that delaying the Germans would be the order of
the day. If they suffered enough delays to their objectives, it would
give the British forces enough time to re-group and re- organise for
a counter attack2.
Fields were cluttered with obstacles to prevent glider landings.
Bridges were guarded., road signs removed to confuse the enemy. Parts
of East Anglia had been flooded including Romney marsh, more would be
flooded to slow down a German advance when the Germans invaded.
Tanks
traps,hedgehogs and dragons teeth would also have some effectiveness
in slowing down an armoured advance, assuming the Germans could
transport them across the Channel. It is doubtful that anti-tank
defence would have ever been needed if what Robinson wrote is to be
believed. He claims that the Germans were not planning to bring tanks
in any quantity, or vehicles. They were to rely on horses, 125,00 of
them3.
Horses do not repel bullets, need feeding and are slow compared to
other vehicles. The German army high command did not want to
transport fuel, or rely on capturing British fuel dumps.
How many
troops did Britain have ready to fight in 1940? Over 300,000 were
evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940, more from other ports such as Brest
,St Lo and Cherbourg took the total to over 500,0004.These
troops would need to be rested and re-equipped before being put on an
active role again. Local Defence Volunteers were formed on 14th
May 19405,
men who were too young or old could enrol and take part in defending
their local town or village. They were later renamed the Home Guard
and by the end of June 1940 they numbered more than 1,400,0006.
The Home Guard was at first very badly equipped, having to use
personal firearms, Molotov cocktails, pickaxe handles and even
improvising pikes. They had no uniform at first, just an LDV armband,
and these were home-made. Putting these inadequacies to one side,
they would serve two purposes: They would attract men who could
otherwise get in the way of the regular forces, should an invasion
come. Being part of the armed forces would mean they could not be
like partisans. Also. they would significantly contribute to the
delay needed for the armed forces to regroup, and then counter
attack.
Auxiliary Units were to be used after the invasion had passed through their area. They were ordinary people who would operate in civilian clothes. When the invasion happened they would hide out in specially made bunkers, often camouflaged in woods and perform various tasks. These included sabotaging any German vehicles, reporting German movements by radio to the military and relaying messages. The saboteurs among them were to fight with guns and explosives until their ammunition ran out, then if they were still alive, disband and go back to their own homes.
Auxiliary Units were to be used after the invasion had passed through their area. They were ordinary people who would operate in civilian clothes. When the invasion happened they would hide out in specially made bunkers, often camouflaged in woods and perform various tasks. These included sabotaging any German vehicles, reporting German movements by radio to the military and relaying messages. The saboteurs among them were to fight with guns and explosives until their ammunition ran out, then if they were still alive, disband and go back to their own homes.
As a last resort, gas was to be used on the Germans. Churchill had authorised this in 1940, gas was to be sprayed on German troops by Fairey Battle aircraft. This may seem drastic nowadays, but what choice did Churchill have? There was nowhere left to evacuate to and he knew the Germans had to be stopped.
The
Germans were planning to land at least 160,000 troops off the English
coast. It is necessary to use one's imagination at this point.
Germany had troops, tanks and horses but no way of transporting them
quickly over the English Channel. The Germans planned to use steamers
and tugs towing barges, Robinson states that there would be nearly
1000 barges towed across the Channel7.
Obviously such transport was completely inadequate and unsuitable for
such a task. An armed escort would consist of a total of 8 destroyers
and numerous E-boats8.
Opposing this invasion fleet would be at least 44 destroyers and
cruisers9,
(this does not take into account the British submarine fleet or
U-boats). Even the most biased of opinions cannot be swayed by these
facts. The German invasion fleet would have at least suffered a
severe mauling.
Airborne
troops had been used by the Germans in Holland to capture bridges and
airfields. They also knocked out the Belgian fort at Eben Emael. They
proved useful in surprise attacks behind the front line, but were far
from invincible. The problem for Sea Lion would be shortage of
transport aircraft (Ju-52), and the lack of heavy weapons. Airborne
troops could carry only light weapons and mortars, which would make
them unable to resist a determined counter-attack. JU-52's were
generally unarmed, and would prove easy meat for fighter aircraft.
Assuming
the Germans got ashore, they would be outnumbered, unable to land in
strength due to the transportation problems and under attack from
both land and air as the Royal Air Force proved impossible to defeat.
The landing barges could only be unloaded from the stern, they were
slow and would ride very low in the water. This would involve some
manoeuvring, which would take time and make these makeshift landing
craft easy targets for the coastal defences, the RAF and the Royal
Navy. The RAF had provided air cover at the evacuation of France. It
was not perfect, ships and troops were often under attack on the
beaches, but the fact remains that because of the RAF nearly half a
million troops escaped to Britain to fight again.
The
longer Hitler and his forces delayed meant that more defences would
be built, more men trained and more equipment would be made in
British factories. Large quantities of supplies began to arrive from
the United States and Canada. On 9th July 200,000 rifles
from the U.S.A10.
75,000 Ross rifles were on their way from Canada11.
Britain had also bought the entire production of the Thompson Machine
Co of Chicago – 5,000 machine guns a month12.
This would replace weapons lost in France, and ensure the Home guard
was armed properly. Eventually ,Britain received re-conditioned
American destroyers ( at least 50)in exchange for bases in British
Colonies such as Trinidad, Bermuda and St Lucia.
The
Germans concentrated on aerial domination , there is no need to go
into great detail about the Battle of Britain. It is widely known
that the Germans could not defeat the RAF, and were unwilling to
cross the Channel until the RAF had been defeated by the Luftwaffe.
By the time the Battle of Britain had ended it was September, which
meant a rougher Channel crossing for an improvised invasion fleet,
and shorter daylight hours, which could mean no air cover for an
invasion fleet. This would leave it exposed to the Royal Navy
destroyers.
Assuming
half the troops and horses landed safely what would happen then? They
would be under constant fore from beach defences. They would have to
advance through barbed wire and minefields. Those that survived all
this would have to wipe out the soldiers in the trenches and
pillboxes and then fight reinforcements that would inevitably arrive.
They would have to advance inland to meet up with airborne troops
that would have been dropped before the invasion fleet landed. How
effective these troops would have been remains doubtful. Transports
would be shot down before and after dropping their paratroops. They
were only lightly armed and may soon need rescuing themselves. Unlike
the attacks on Denmark Holland and Belgium the British troops were on a
high state of alert. Home Guard and Auxiliary troops would have slowed the German advance further while the main British forces retreated and regrouped. The Royal Navy would be attacking the German
fleet, alongside the RAF. What was the chance of German success, even
if they had got ashore? None. Even if they had made progress, there
is no doubt the British military would have used gas on the invader. The results of
this could be catastrophic but Churchill would have used every weapon
available to defeat a German invasion force.
Bibliography
Gilbert, M, The Second World War.
Robinson, D, (2005), Invasion 1940 London.
DVD
The World At War, (1973), Thames television. The episode Alone is particularly relevant to this essay.
DVD
The World At War, (1973), Thames television. The episode Alone is particularly relevant to this essay.
McCann, G, The Home Guard and Dad's Army, found
at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/dads_army_01.shtml
.
Cruickshank,
D, The German Threat To Britain In World War 2, found at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/invasion_ww2_01.shtml
.
BBC News, On
This Day June 4th 1940, found at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_3500000/3500865.stm
.
British
Resistance Archive, found at:http://www.coleshillhouse.com/
.
Walberswick
Coastal Defences Of World War 2, found at:
http://www.walberswickww2.co.uk/
.
Footnotes
1http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml,
accessed 20/11/13.
2The
German Threat To Britain In World War 2, Cruickshank, D, found
at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/invasion_ww2_01.shtml
.
3Robinson
D, Invasion 1940, p.127.
4BBC
News, On This Day June 4th 1940, found
at:http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/4/newsid_3500000/3500865.stm
.
5The
Home Guard and Dad's Army, McCann,G, found at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/dads_army_01.shtml
6Ibid.
7Robinson,
D, xi.
8Ibid,
x, xi.
9Ibid.
10Robinson,
p.105.
11Ibid,
p.106.
12Ibid,p108.
13, Just found this online, 12.6.15, Just found this online, the results of a Sandhurst College wargame in 1974. Adolf Galland, Friedrich Ruge and Heinrich Trettner took part. Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974. This can be found at:
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario
is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously
unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.
Each side (played by British and German officers respectively)
was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted
on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School
of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland,
Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher
Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz
Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.
The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the
Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible
invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides
(for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until
late September to assemble the necessary shipping.
Glossary
FJ = Fallschirmjaeger (German paratroops)
MTB = Motor Torpedo Boat (German equivalent, E-Boat)
DD = Destroyer
CA = Heavy Cruiser
BB = Battleship
CV = Aircraft Carrier
22nd September - morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches
at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between
Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton).
In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.
The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during
the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one
CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged,
whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings
which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations
were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions
in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three
were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on
the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised
brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were
identified.
Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200
fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF
even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs,
but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their
short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible
into the Pas de Calais.
22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although
they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading
on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing
raids and then further losses at their ports in France.
The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost
contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with
supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to
run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats
and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However
a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was
completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs
inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the
Channel. German shipping losses on the first day
amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially
the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.
23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and
70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such
that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large
forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a
German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to
the South West.
The German Navy were despondant about their losses,
especially as the loss of barges was seriously
dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce
commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for
the transfer of the next echelon continued along with
the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses
of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters
and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides
overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.
The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although
long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind
commando group interdicted the runways. The first British
counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured
brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings.
7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive
anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky
bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken
Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand
Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the
rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on
Dover having lost 35% casualties.
Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort,
with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF
persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of
this effort was directed for ground support and air
resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover
over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air
range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs
and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little
surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs
entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats,
they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German
flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at
dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing
all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.
The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many
cases these were incomplete and waiting for their
second echelon to arrive that night. The weather
was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision
to sail was referred up the chain of command.
23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter
inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second
echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the
weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat
rendered the Channel indefensible without air support.
Goring countered this by saying it could only be done
by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn
Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.
The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only
440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and
once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in
early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost
another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides
overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for
inflated figures.
On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover
and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses
around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians
attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave,
but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By
the time the order reached the ports, the second wave
could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th
divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not
be reinforced at all.
Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats,
E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th
destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off
the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn
committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded
with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two
CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The
faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone,
but the port had been so badly damaged that they could
only unload two at a time.
The failure on the crossing meant that the German
situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient
ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without
extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead.
Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland
and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as
further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast
steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation
via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed
on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest
were killed or captured.
13, Just found this online, 12.6.15, Just found this online, the results of a Sandhurst College wargame in 1974. Adolf Galland, Friedrich Ruge and Heinrich Trettner took part. Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974. This can be found at:
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario
is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously
unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.
Each side (played by British and German officers respectively)
was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted
on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School
of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland,
Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher
Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz
Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.
The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the
Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible
invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides
(for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until
late September to assemble the necessary shipping.
Glossary
FJ = Fallschirmjaeger (German paratroops)
MTB = Motor Torpedo Boat (German equivalent, E-Boat)
DD = Destroyer
CA = Heavy Cruiser
BB = Battleship
CV = Aircraft Carrier
22nd September - morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches
at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between
Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton).
In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.
The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during
the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one
CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged,
whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings
which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations
were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions
in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three
were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on
the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised
brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were
identified.
Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200
fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF
even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs,
but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their
short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible
into the Pas de Calais.
22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although
they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading
on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing
raids and then further losses at their ports in France.
The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost
contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with
supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to
run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats
and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However
a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was
completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs
inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the
Channel. German shipping losses on the first day
amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially
the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.
23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and
70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such
that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large
forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a
German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to
the South West.
The German Navy were despondant about their losses,
especially as the loss of barges was seriously
dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce
commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for
the transfer of the next echelon continued along with
the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses
of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters
and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides
overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.
The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although
long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind
commando group interdicted the runways. The first British
counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured
brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings.
7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive
anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky
bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken
Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand
Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the
rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on
Dover having lost 35% casualties.
Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort,
with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF
persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of
this effort was directed for ground support and air
resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover
over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air
range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs
and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little
surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs
entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats,
they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German
flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at
dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing
all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.
The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many
cases these were incomplete and waiting for their
second echelon to arrive that night. The weather
was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision
to sail was referred up the chain of command.
23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter
inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second
echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the
weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat
rendered the Channel indefensible without air support.
Goring countered this by saying it could only be done
by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn
Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.
The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only
440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and
once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in
early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost
another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides
overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for
inflated figures.
On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover
and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses
around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians
attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave,
but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By
the time the order reached the ports, the second wave
could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th
divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not
be reinforced at all.
Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats,
E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th
destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off
the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn
committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded
with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two
CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The
faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone,
but the port had been so badly damaged that they could
only unload two at a time.
The failure on the crossing meant that the German
situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient
ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without
extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead.
Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland
and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as
further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast
steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation
via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed
on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest
were killed or captured.
There are a number of problems with this article. The most fundamental being that it has been written as though invasion would be attempted despite the RAF not being wiped out. A (sensible) pre-requisite of nazi invasion was the removal of the RAF as an effected fighting force. Therefore, all references to RAF opposition to an invasion force should be removed.
ReplyDeleteWhilst the Luftwaffe did not close the channel to allied shipping, they did force a withdrawl of several RN ships. Would it not be safe to assume that in the event of invasion, Luftwaffe units would be assigned to continuing this harassment?
Horses? The Wehrmacht panzer units advanced against (charging) Polish Cavalry in 1940. Why reverse that situation when they had already seen that it was heroic but suicidal?
Bench defenses: Our beach defenses were far inferior to what the D-Day invasion faced, but most of that was overcome at a fair speed. Fair conclusion: what we had wouldn't slow the Germans down for long.
The mentions of using a poorly-equipped Volunteer defense force to "slow them down." Let's be honest... that's a translation for "expendable." They'd have been cut down in their thousands. Heroic, but suicidal.
As you say, the B.E.F. left France sans equipment. The British Army was wildly demoralised, tired and depressingly ill-equipped. Their fightback would not have been mighty. Determined, but on the back foot.
I could keep going.......
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ReplyDeleteIf the Germans had invaded with a decent plan, it would not have been out of the question if they had done it before the RAF had been destroyed or forced to move further north.
Horses were used by the Wermacht for transport throughout the war. Only the first wave during a Blitzkrieg attack was fully mechanised.
The German navy possessed no bespoke landing craft, they were busy converting barges which would be towed by tugs across the Channel. The tugs would then release the barges which would have to turn round and approach the beach. There are several problems with this.
1) Any crossing of the channel would be undertaken during a period of darkness. The wash alone from an RN destroyer would be enough to sink any ad hoc landing fleet the Germans sent across.
2) The enemy landing fleet would be vulnerable to ground troops as they disembarked.
3) Barges were made for canals, not a sea crossing. there would have been losses from boats being swamped during a rough crossing.
Beach defences in Britain were not as robust as what the Allies faced in Normandy on D-Day, true Mr Critic. The British had witnessed how stupid it was to depend on one solid line of defence when the Germans invaded the Ardennes, going past the Maginot Line. Instead, they used one line of defence at the beaches, knowing full well they would not have held out under sustained attack, whilst the bulk of the army retreated. There were a series of these defensive lines built across the country. the plan was to regroup, then counter attack when the Germans had made significant advances inland. ( Surviving German Generals wargamed Operation Sea Lion in the early 1970's and agreed invasion would not have been successful).
Yes the BEF left the bulk of the equipment in France, but by July was significantly re-equipped with rifles and machine guns, and yes, Auxilliaries and LDV would have been massacred, but slowed the advance allowing the regular army to retreat, regroup and counter attack.
To invade successfully the German forces would have had to invade in June or beginning of July. Like any other army, they had to consolidate their forces in France, re-equip and rest. Then build an invasion fleet of barges, motor boats and tugs. hardly LST's and LSI's?
The longer they left it, the stronger the British became. More arms arrived from America, more guns built in Britain, more bunkers built, more lines of defence completed.
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